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Moral philosophy has for quite some time practiced the use of thought 
experiments in argumentative strategies. Thought experiments can be 
understood as imagined scenarios with a certain level of complexity 
and novelty, which are usually designed and used to elicit our respon-
ses or moral intuitions in order to make our use of key moral concepts 
clearer or in order to support or reject a particular ethical theory, ge-
neral moral principle, hypothesis, deeply held moral belief or presup-
position. Such imagined cases also often offer us a new insight, illumi-
nation and perspective on a given problem. One of the open questions 
is what is the epistemic status and value of such generated intuitions 
given their variability and instability. The paper combines a moderate 
defence of moral intuitions with a discussion of selected aspects of the 
use of cases in ethics education.
Key  words:  moral intuition, reflection, thought experiments, imagi-
ned cases, ethics education
Introduction
The paper addresses some aspects of epistemic value of moral in-
tuitions,  particularly  as  related  to  though  experiments  and  imagined 
cases, and is part of a broader outline of the defence of moral intuition-
ism. In using the term ‘intuitionism’ it is useful to employ Bernard Wil-
liams’ distinction between epistemological intuitionism and methodo-
logical intuitionism, according to which the latter relates to the thesis 
of plurality of mutually irreducible basic moral principles or grounds 
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(that cannot be ordered in advanced and put into some kind of meta-
principle) and the former aiming at the thesis that moral intuition is a 
pathway towards (at least a portion) of our moral knowledge (Williams, 
1995, 182–191). The paper is mainly focused on epistemic aspect of 
intuitionism.
A more specific problem within this view is the question about 
the epistemic role or value of our moral intuitions. Even more specifi-
cally there are a number of open issues in relation to the use of thought 
experiments in ethics, especially the difficulty of moral disagreement 
and the apparent instability of such intuitions. At least some thought 
experiments in ethics can be legitimately described as intuition pumps 
(as opposed to mere imagined cases that we reflect upon) that are spe-
cifically devised to elicit a particular intuitive response. Furthermore, 
some of those thought experiments as related to our responses can be 
understood as broadly analogous to perceptual illusions in the sense the 
two or more supposedly morally equivalent moral situations elicit radi-
cally different moral responses. The paper endeavours to address these 
issues by offering an outline of the view of moral intuition (and moral 
perception) and investigate how the notion of ‘seeming’ enters the pic-
ture and what role do seemings play in moral thought experiments. The 
lessons learned will have a bearing upon a more general question about 
the relation between ethical theory and practice and will also help to 
illuminate what the role of such intuitions is and what consequences 
these lessons have also for ethics education based on reflection on (im-
agined) cases.
The paper starts (section 1) by briefly introducing the notion of in-
tuition and thought-experiment. Section 2 focuses more specifically on 
moral intuition, presents a wide variety of understandings of moral in-
tuition and some of its methodological, epistemic and structural aspects. 
Next, several challenges for moral intuition, particularly concerning its 
epistemic value and role are raised. The main worries concern the ap-
parent instability of our intuitions and disagreement that accompanies 
them. Section 4 puts forward a limited defence of moral intuition, ap-
pealing also to a more nuanced discrimination between moral intuition, 
moral perception and moral imagination. The paper concludes (section 
5) with some of the consequences all this has for the role of moral intu-
ition in ethics education where the so-called case-based approach can-
not avoid the mentioned issues regarding moral intuition.
V. Strahovnik: Some Aspects of Epistemic Value … METODIČKI OGLEDI, 21 (2014) 2, 35–51
37
1. Intuition and thought experiments
Philosophy has from its beginnings harboured attempts (from Pla-
to’s nóesis to Cartesian clear and distinct perception) to ground philo-
sophical truths, ideas and theories on basic, intuitive judgments that are 
justified in themselves and in this sense foundational. Many of such 
attempts were abandoned in the light of the scientific revolution and be-
ginnings of modern science, which have shaken the reliability and use-
fulness of our intuitions about the essences and nature of external, natu-
ral world. Furthermore, the development of philosophy continued in 
direction of doubt about intuitions regarding other aspects of the world, 
our experience and language (e.g. regarding introspection and concep-
tual schemes). Logical positivists rejected intuitions as a special kind of 
intellectual cognition and accepted only analytic conceptual truths and 
perceptual experience based knowledge. The critique of analicity and 
the myth of the given has resurfaced the discussion on intuition, but this 
time not necessarily involving intuitions as self-evident necessary truth, 
but as the most fundamental beliefs, which can represent a basis or a 
starting point in our search for the answers to philosophical questions 
(the method of reflective equilibrium among others falls under this cat-
egory) (Gutting, 1998, 3–13). The question about the role and status 
of philosophical intuitions thus in a sense became a question about the 
existence of philosophy as an autonomous discipline (DePaul, Ramsey, 
1998). On the one hand, a more naturalistically inclined philosophers 
argue that philosophical intuitions do not represent a special access to 
knowledge or to philosophical truths and often refer to psychological 
research of intuition that reveal them as highly conditioned and unsta-
ble. Philosophy and its methods form a continuum with the methods of 
modern sciences that can shed light into every possible field of inquiry. 
Within this tradition the role of philosophy is to deal with the most 
general and universal questions of science(s). On the other hand, less 
naturalistically inclined philosophers argue that philosophical intuitions 
represent an essentially non-empirical domain of knowledge, but what 
still remains open is how exactly are we to understand intuition and its 
epistemic status.
One can distinguish between intuition in the propositional sense 
and intuition in the psychological, attitudinal sense; in the former sense 
we are speaking about intuitions as self-evident proposition or proposi-
tions that we are cognizing intuitively, in the latter sense intuitions are 
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a kind (or an element) of cognitions or beliefs, which are e.g. non-in-
ferential and not easily disregarded (Audi, 2004). In this psychological 
sense, the most common conception of intuition is closely related to no-
tions of propositional attitude, spontaneous judgment or non-inferential 
belief. In this paper, I will focus mostly on this latter understanding of 




cal and logical truths to philosophical intuitions (e.g. related to consid-
eration in regards to paradoxes such as Sorites or Sleeping Beauty). For 
at least some of those cognitions or intuitions we are inclined to count 
them as knowledge; probably not many would deny that we know that 
2 + 2 = 4 or that nothing round could be a square at the same time (Sosa, 
1998, 258).
Ernest Sosa developed a notion of minimal intuition, which we can 
use as a basis for further discussion. Sosa claims that we can start with 
an understanding of intuition as a kind of apprehension without reason-
ing, intuitive seeming coupled with inclination to believe its contents, 
and that this can be spelled out in the following way:
“At t, it is intuitive to S that p iff (a) if a t S were merely to understand fully 
enough the proposition that p (absent relevant perception, introspection, and 
reasoning), then S would believe that p; (b) at t, S does understand the propo-
sition that P; and (c) the proposition that p is abstract.” (Sosa, 1998, 259)
Sosa has with this in mind typical cases of intuitions such as that 
2 + 2 = 4, that no triangle is a square, or intuition regarding the validity 
of modus ponens. One virtue of his approach is that it stresses the ana-
logy between ostensible perception and intellectual appearance or seem-
ing on which intuition is based. Just as it seems to us that the edge of 
the round glass in elliptical when viewed from an angle and that the two 
lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are not of equal length, we can have 
an intuitive seeming or intellectual appearance (e.g. in cases of riddles 
and paradoxes like Monty Hall, Newcomb’s paradox or sorites) without 
assenting to intuitive belief about them. This might be a good place to 
grasp the notion of intuition, especially as related of philosophical in-
tuitions and thought experiments.
Next, I briefly consider the notion of a thought experiment before 
going on to deal with challenges for moral intuition. Thought experi-
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ments can be understood as imagined scenarios or cases with at least a 
certain level of complexity and novelty. They are usually designed and 




ple, hypothesis or presupposition or to offer us a new insight, illumina-
tion or perspective on a given problem or case (Gendler Szabo, 2002, 
388). They are also useful for revealing particular implicit assumptions 
in our considered opinions that we tend to miss otherwise.
Usually thought experiments can be designed in part analogously 
to other types of experiments, that is in a way that offers us some control 
and possible variation of variables (Harris, 2011, 4). As such, they are 
sometimes described as intuition pumps, wonderful imagination grab-
bers and “jungle gyms for the imagination” (Dennett, 2013), that guide 
the way we tend to think about some problem or an issue and are thus 
themselves not arguments but stories that draw out intuitive responses 
that are then further used in arguments. Many of them can “pump” our 
intuitions in contrasting directions, especially when a relevant variable 
in them changes or with the change of context. They can also be under-
stood as a sort of distillate of a kind of reasoning or position in its pur-
est form, which allow us to “sharpen our perceptions” in regards to it 
(Harris, 2011, 5). Thought experiments pose several important question 
regarding the reliability and usefulness of intuitions based on them and 
feasibility of the underlying methodology. In what follows, the focus is 
on moral intuitions, in particular as arising out of imaginary cases and 
thought experiments.
2. Moral intuition, moral perception and judgment
Many times philosophers dismiss moral intuitions and judgments 
based on them as merely a kind of “shooting from the hip” (Singer, 
2005, 331), i.e. as snap judgments made in absence of considered and 
careful reflection. There has been a body of evidence and related dis-
cussions pointing towards evolutionary and social conditioning of mor-
al intuitions, their arbitrariness, groundlessness and instability (Haidt, 
2011, 814–834; Singer, 2005, 331–352). But on the other hand, when 
developing a moral theory it seems that one cannot simply avoid them; 
V. Strahovnik: Some Aspects of Epistemic Value … METODIČKI OGLEDI, 21 (2014) 2, 35–51
40
furthermore many agree that in developing a moral theory “we must 
start from somewhere in current folk morality, otherwise we start from 
somewhere unintuitive, and that can hardly be a good place to start” 
(Jackson, 2000, 135). In the broadest sense this gets sometimes reflect-
ed in the general claim that moral theories are better “to the extent that 
they accord with moral claims that are attractive on their own right 
– i.e. apart from any inferential support they receive from other moral 
claims” (Hooker, 2002, 161).
Such diversity among moral philosophers regarding the utilization 
or usefulness of moral intuitions can be at least partially attributed to a 
very wide-ranging and vague use and understanding of the concept. In 
many ways the term moral intuition is a kind of umbrella term covering 
phenomena ranging from (i) any kind of common, widely shared and 
firm moral judgment, that is made without a specific commitment to a 
particular moral theory; and going through (ii) immediate, spontaneous, 
relatively strong, compelling and at least experientially non-inferential 
moral judgments; (iii) pre-theoretical, direct, non-inferential moral 
judgment that can be accepted on the basis of an adequate understand-
ing of their contents accompanied with firmness; (iv) deliverances of a 
special moral sense that detect moral reality; to (v) apparently or genu-
inely self-evident truths or principles (Lillehammer, 2011, 175–200, in: 
Audi, 2004).
In what follows I propose a more finely tuned understanding of 
moral intuition (following mostly the view developed by Robert Audi), 
and distinguish  this generic notion of  intuition  from a kind of moral 
perception and moral imagination, which can also be inherent in moral 
thought experiments and reflection on imagined cases.
Audi distinguishes four basic characteristics of moral intuition. 
Moral intuition is non-inferential or direct in a sense that when we be-
lieve a proposition based on an intuition we have made no inference 
towards it (this does not mean that it cannot also be arrived to by infer-
ential way). Moral intuitions are also characterized by firmness, in the 
sense that they are accompanied by phenomenology of fittingness and 
we usually hold judgments based on them with firm conviction and not 
dismiss then easily. Moral intuitions may require deeper understanding 
and a suitable comprehension of their propositional objects (that can 
vary with their complexity). Lastly, moral intuitions are pretheoreti-
cal in the sense that they are not directly related to specific theoretical 
V. Strahovnik: Some Aspects of Epistemic Value … METODIČKI OGLEDI, 21 (2014) 2, 35–51
41
posits (Audi, 2004, 32–36). We can further clear the air around the no-
tion of moral intuitions by denying that they must be infallible, directly 
immediate, provide indefeasible justification or be grounded in special 
cognitive faculty akin to a moral sense as it is sometimes suggested. 
Sources of such moral  intuition are diverse and encompass moral re-
flection (the most usual case, when we form a moral intuition, e.g. upon 
careful reflection of an aspect of action), moral perception, moral im-
agination and moral emotion (Audi, 2013).
Structural aspects of moral intuitions mostly concern the level of 
their generality. There are several positions possible here. Perceptual in-
tuitionism (following Sidgwick’s terminology; Sidgwick, 1981) argues 
for intuitiveness of particular moral judgments, i.e. is simple, non-in-
ferential and immediate moral intuitions that can justify our judgments 
about the concrete cases without any substantive import of moral gen-
eralizations; sometimes such  judgments are even made  in contrast  to 
some of the accepted principles. Dogmatic intuitionism tries to identify 
generally morally relevant types of action and claims that moral intui-
tion reveals this general moral relevance. Dogmatic intuitionist like H. 
A. Prichard focus on types of actions and endeavour to arrive at a list 
of basic duties (middle-level moral axioms) that would cover morality. 
Philosophical intuitionism that Sidgwick is defending tries to go be-
yond such attempts and reveal the basic axioms of morality that would 
be self-evident and would systematize our moral thought and practice. 
Our notion of moral intuition would probably differ regarding on which 
level we tend to focus. A moral theory can thus begin with moral intu-
itions at any level of moral inquiry.
One  thing  that  arises  from  this  is  that  it  is  useful  to  distinguish 
between intuitive judgment about particular cases and judgment about 
moral principles, e.g. in terms of W. D. Ross’ distinction between over-
all moral judgment pertaining to the importance and balance of prima 
facie  duties  in  particular  cases  and  intuitive  judgments  about  prima 
facie duties, i.e. seeing their grounds as universally morally relevant and 
thus functioning as basic, indefeasible moral reasons whenever they are 
present. Ross was famously very sceptical about overall judgments and 
claimed that while we can attain knowledge about prima facie duties, 
in concrete situations when we form an overall moral judgment about 
a particular action we are restricted to merely probable opinion (Ross, 
1939, 188), since the moral importance of different prima facie duties 
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and the way they interact in a particular case is not self-evident. This 
shows moral intuitionism does not have to necessarily regard moral 
judgments about particular cases as paradigmatic form of moral intu-
ition. Moral intuition or intuitive judgments are also often accompanied 
by characteristic phenomenology; we tend to experience them both as 
felt inclinations to believe and as responsive to reasons and fitting to a 
situation or an aspect of a situation we are considering as ground for 
judgment.
3. Challenges for moral intuition
If we move to moral thought experiments we can reiterate the char-
acterizations made above for thought experiments in general. Moral 
thought experiments are usually designed to elicit some intuitions re-
garding the imagined scenario such that they either conform with or 
oppose some moral belief, moral principle or moral theory. Well-known 
moral thought experiments such as Trolley Problem, Violinist, Survival 
Lottery or Rescue Case use such generated intuitions in further argu-
ments in developing or opposing some ethical theory. There is a pletho-
ra of familiar counter arguments against a use of moral thought experi-
ments in general, but the paper will avoid this more general discussion 
and instead try to investigate what sort of problems and challenges they 
generate for the above presented picture of moral intuition.
Among these challenges I want to address the following. If most 
thought experiments function as intuition pumps and we can control 
them in a way that pumps our intuitions in opposite directions (even 
using some presumably morally irrelevant factors), how can we rely 
on intuitive responses gathered from them to demonstrate anything and 
how can they figure in further argumentative steps? Secondly, given 
that most of the cases of moral thought experiments reveal noticeable 
disagreement or even inconsistency, that is both within our own intu-
itive responses and responses of our peers, how can we account for that 
in defence of moral intuitions? We can label the first one instability and 
irelevance challenge and the second one disagreement challenge.
Instability and irrelevance challenge. If intuitions are not stable 
in the sense that a minor, presumably morally irrelevant change of the 
presented case or situation can change or even reverse our moral judg-
ment, how then we can reliably rely to moral intuition as a source of 
moral knowledge?
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“This problem is illustrated by the ease with which many of us are prone to 
get stuck when trying to ethically distinguish between variants of the same 
though experiment, such as killing one person in order to save five by, alter-
natively, pushing them onto a train, pushing the train onto them, wobbling a 
handrail on which they are leaning, flipping a switch that turns on their roller 
skates, or flipping a switch that changes a train’s direction from one track to 
another.” (Lillehammer, 2011, 176)
Disagreement challenge. Moral thought experiments reveal im-
portant disagreement between our moral intuitions, both regarding dif-
ferent respondents and within a single respondent. This moral disagree-
ment can also resist the exclusion possible sources of error such bias, 
framing issues, factual mistakes, etc. Is there a way to mitigate these 
two worries?
4. Defending the epistemic value and role of moral intuition
There are several lines of defence that a proponent of intuitionism 
can bring forward. Let us start with the most general one and then move 
to more specific ones.
The  first  thing,  not  related  merely  to  moral  intuition,  relates  to 
the so-called ideological polarity of interesting philosophical concepts 
(like free will, knowledge, belief, responsibility, obligation), that are 
often object of philosophical investigation and intuitions. Horgan and 
Graham in their paper apocalyptically titled “Southern Fundamental-
ism and the End of Philosophy” (Graham, Horgan, 1998, 271–292) put 
forward a suggestion to understand philosophy primarily as “ideology” 
or ideological research, i.e. research and investigation of the nature and 
functioning of ideas and concepts like freedom, justification, etc. Such 
“ideology” is the heart of philosophy, but in the post-analytical age we 
should no longer understand it within the framework of traditional, ap-
rioristic analytical method, but by combining these aspects with apos-
teriori and interdisciplinary methodology. A philosopher contributes to 
the investigation intuitions that he or she makes “from the armchair” 
and which are partially determined by our conceptual competence. 
These intuitions can then further serve as “empirical data”, which are 
in principle defeasible and fallible, but must nonetheless enjoy a high 
level of epistemic reliability and justification, which means that the ma-
jority of them will for a given ideological theory reveal as true or cor-
rect. One obstacle in this is the so-called ideological polarity, which has 
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a as consequence that intuitions about a given concept can draw us into 
opposing directions (e.g. as it is in the case of free will and determinism 
in various scenarios that we put forward to investigate free will). What 
can provide help in these cases is broadly a method of wide reflective 
equilibrium, accompanied with two more specific principles, namely 
the principle of accommodation (a chosen theory must in general ac-
commodate intuitive judgments in a way that preserves them as cor-
rect) and the principle of respect (intuitive judgment that get rejected as 
mistaken due to ideological polarity must be treated respectfully, that 
is in a way that acknowledges and explains their intuitive plausibility) 
(Graham, Horgan, 1998, 277–278). This proposal can also be seen as 
echoing a thought already made by Aristotle:
“But, just as in other cases as well, after positing the phenomena and first rai-
sing perplexities about them, one ought in this way to bring to light especially 
all the received opinions about these experiences or, failing that, the greatest 
number and most authoritative of those opinions. For if the vexing questions 
are solved and the received opinions remain standing, then the matter would 
be adequately explained.” (Aristotle, 2011, NE 1145a2–8)
With these two principles and under the assumption that we can 
ascribe at least some evidential value to moral intuitions and judgments 
based upon them, then one of the most plausible options for practical 
ethics is to follow the method of wide reflective equilibrium, allowing 
intuitive judgment to enter it at different levels of generality and with 




other relevant beliefs (Daniels, 1979, 256–282), including “reflective 
coherence between ethical intuitions and evidence about their causes 
and functional role” (Lillehammer, 2011, 186) and this will then in-
clude background theories about our existing ethical commitments and 
intuitions. Thus, such intuitions are revisable
“… in light of inquiry if ethical intuitions fail to cohere with a better informed 
conception of their causal pedigree. In other words, we are not victims of a 
compulsive or fatalistic attachment to our ethical commitments.” (Lilleham-
mer, 2011, 187)
The methodology of wide reflective equilibrium requires such an 
inclusion of evidence and theories about our intuitions. What emerges 
is a view that these
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“… intuitions are presumptively credible, not because they have some spe-
cial property of ‘intuitiveness’ but because there is good evidence to believe 
that they would survive in a state of wide reflective equilibrium where their 
potential reliance on ethically irrelevant or otherwise discreditable criteria of 
evaluation would be exposed and washed out.” (Lillehammer, 2011, 189)
Such understanding and recognition of wide reflective equilibrium 
can even upgrade traditional intuitionism, since both Sidgwick and 
Ross allowed for some sort of reflective equilibrium process to unify 
our intuitions.
The  second  line  of  defence  of  intuitionism  and  intuitions  is  the 
above mentioned differentiation between intuitive judgment about 
morally  relevant  aspects  of  situations  and  overall  moral  judgments 
about them. A large portion of disagreement regarding moral thought 
experiments  and  imagined  cases  is  not  related  to  the  recognition  of 
which features of those situations have moral relevance, but what is 
the overall balance of their ethical importance or stringency (e.g. in 
the Trolley case or Five Patients case there is usually agreement on the 
basic  morally  relevant  features  present;  disagreement  steams  mostly 
on their weight they contribute to the overall moral status of possible 
actions).
A third aspect of thought experiments and imagined cases we can 
point to is their “thin” nature. With this I have in mind that they are 
usually under-described, i.e. described in a few sentences and mostly 
focused on the conflict between the general duties. As such they can be 
easily determined by the previous assumptions of moral theory (agency, 
moral decision-making, etc.) and other presuppositions. This leads to 
an impoverished picture of moral conflict, which can lead to unfounded 
conclusions and varied intuitions. Real life moral dilemmas that we are 
faced with are much thicker and can emerge within a much richer net-
work connections, attachments, care, relationships, etc., and as such not 
only concern duties but also other dimensions of responsibility. Further, 
cases in thought experiments are presented without a broader context 
and lack the dimension of time, i.e. their placement in moral history, 
while the agent in them is presented as ideal, perfect, neutral, atemporal 
agent (McDonald, 1993, 255–237). Given this, at least some instability 
of intuitions and disagreement is to be expected.
Lastly, we can point out several dimensions of moral thought in-
volved in moral intuition.
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“Intuition is best understood not simply as a grasp of the obvious, but rather 
as a cognition of the kind that, often because a complex pattern is in view, can 
be the core of, or at least provide evidence for judgment.” (Audi, 2013, 135)
Among the sources of moral intuition we can include moral reflec-
tion, moral perception (or quasi-perception), moral emotion and moral 
imagination. Moral reflection often yields moral intuition about types of 
acts or basic morally relevant features of them, while moral perception 
usually concerns concrete cases and overall moral status of concrete ac-
tions. Moral emotion can be understood as a multi-facted psychological 
response to experience (real or imagined) and can also be involved in 
shaping moral intuition. Moral imagination can provide us insight and 
transcends what we can perceive; it can combine various elements and 
alter  them freely; all  this  then evokes our  intuitive responses  to such 
imagined acts, cases or situations.
5. Moral intuitions, imagined cases and ethics education
Before going on to relationship between imagined cases, thought 
experiments and ethics education, we can further clarify and systema-
tize several roles of thought experiments and relate them to educational 
dimension. As described above, one we can roughly delineate four dif-
ferent uses of thought experiments (Walsh, 2011, 467–481). In moral 
theory they are often used as counter-examples or reduction ad absur-
dum of a particular moral theory or moral position. In the context of 
ethics education this means the use of aporia in teaching, where teacher 
and student can clear a way for further thinking and reflection. Sec-
ondly, they can function as intuition pumps in the sense that they elicit 
responses from us in such a way that we are then inclined to draw a 
particular conclusion on the basis of them. Again, in the context of edu-
cation this relates closely to creation of reflective, engaged and stimu-
lating involvement and critical reflection. Thirdly, they can be used as 
clarification devices, which function in the way that enhances our un-
derstanding by enabling us to differentiate distinct – but till now e.g. 
conflated or vague – concepts and principles. This is also crucial in the 
process of education, since it paves the way for proper explanation of 
the subject matter and organization of knowledge. And lastly, they can 
serve as re-imaginings, which enable us to foster the debate or a given 
dispute in some novel way, surpassing our fixed presuppositions and 
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commitments. This fosters students’ imagination and enables them to 
go beyond their deeply-seated beliefs.
In ethics education thought experiments can thus fruitfully be used 
for a number of purposes, but even more common and widely practices 
method is the use of cases (real or imagined), which can be seen in part 
analogous to thought experiments, especially regarding moral intuitions 
that are generated given the presented cases. The difference between 
both mostly concerns the control and variability of parameters, while 
aspect of moral intuition and related phenomena function similarly.
The use of cases, whether real, modified or imagined in ethics edu-
cation at all levels has been prominent in recent decades, especially in 
fields like business ethics education. The underlying assumptions for 
the use of cases or case studies can be summarized in the following 
way. A teacher or educator introduces a case, usually in the form of a 
dilemma and students are then asked to analyze it and take a perspec-
tive of the person supposedly presented with this dilemma. Two goals 
are inherently presupposed in this. First, in this way students can more 
easily bridge the gap between ethical theory and practice in the sense 
that they can try out different approaches to the situation and see which 
one is more fitting, with an assumption that they will be able to imitate 
or build on that in future cases that might present to them in real life. 
Secondly, such use of cases increases engagement and gives pupils or 
students
“… an opportunity to more fully invest themselves in the situation and the 
dispute contained within it. Students are more likely to do this, it is argued, 
when they can gain a level of vicarious experience of the dilemma.” (Burns 
et al., 2012, 2)
It seems that in this way the use of cases enables us to promote 
and cultivate moral  reasoning  that  is  sensitive  to  context  and  related 
to actual experience, thus making this approach a sensible method for 
ethics education.
One of the proponents of such an approach is Kenneth Strike, who 
stresses that it is essential to focus on
“… acquiring facility with the concepts that regulate our public life. It in-
volves mastery of a form of discourse that integrates moral intuitions, moral 
principles, and background conceptions into a dialogically achieved reflecti-
ve equilibrium.” (Strike, 1993, 111)




moral dialogue on the given ethical issues. This general goal is in ten-
sion with one aspect of his theory (and similar case-based theories) that 
highlights that a good case is somehow constructed around a particular 
moral principle in a way that foresees the desired discussion, since
“… too much detail can be confusing and distracting. Material that is not re-
levant to the moral principle involved should not be included. Cases are more 
like diagrams in a science text than literary works. Their point is to simplify 
the world so as to focus attention on relevant facts and issues.” (Strike, 1993, 
in: Burns et al., 2012, 3)
This seems to take us away from the initial presupposition about 
the goal of ethics education being dialogical and open, into the direc-
tion of giving students a set of rules or decision-making guides, which 
determine the outcome of ethical questions. Practical ethics cannot be 
reduced to
“… a system rules that we could follow (…) The crucial thing is reflection 
and judgment on how to – despite many ethical challenges and dilemmas 
– think ethically and rely on possible guidelines in our judgment.” (Juhant, 
Strahovnik, 2010, 353)
But
“… [i]f a case is constructed by ‘hinting’ at how to examine a set of predeter-
mined principles, the student is being handed a context that is built to reduce 
the disagreement to such a fundamental level that no actual situation could 




salience out of a complete situation. For this we would need to use 
cases with features of ambiguous relevance. Of course, the complexity 
and  indistinctness of  the used  imagined cases  should  reflect  the age, 
level and moral maturity of students. We must take into account that the 
recognition of moral relevance must often precede the application of a 
principle to a case;
“… intuiting the case as falling under a certain description is often logically 
prior to intuiting the principle under which it falls. This makes it preferable 
to take situations, rather than principles, as the object of intuitions.” (Kekes, 
1986, 84)
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We can now turn back to thought experiments, especially to the dif-




related phenomena such as moral reflection, moral (quasi)perception, 
moral emotion and moral imagination. To employ all these aspect of 
moral intuition, then such limited view on the use of cases must be sur-
passed in order to involve even more ethical complexity and the ability 
of student to face it. Martha Nussbaum summarizes this nicely when she 
says that good philosophy often gets us to represented situation from a 
critical practical perspective with ourselves and our own lives and that 
ethical theory can allow us to see relationships that “have eluded us in 
our daily thinking” (Nussbaum, 2000, 253). This enables students to 
develop personalistic and solidary stance, which means to be able to 
“take part on the lives of others in their various aspects of life, includ-
ing experiential life of others” (Žalec, 2011, 98). This can be achieved 
precisely with the use of “thick” cases, which include several aspects 
of moral relevance. What all this shows is a clear need for integrative 
and dialogical approach to ethics education, which is also not afraid of 
ethical theory together with inclusion of thought experiments and moral 
intuition appropriately understood.
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NEKI ASPEKTI EPISTEMIČKE VRIJEDNOSTI 
I ULOGA MORALNIH INTUICIJA U PODUČAVANJU ETIKE
Vojko Strahovnik
Filozofija morala već neko vrijeme koristi misaone eksperimente u argu-
mentativnim strategijama. Misaoni eksperimenti mogu se shvatiti kao zamišljeni 
scenariji s određenom razinom kompleksnosti i novine, koji su obično osmišljeni 
i korišteni za poticanje naših odgovora ili moralnih intuicija kako bismo jasnije 
koristili ključne moralne koncepte te poduprli ili odbacili određenu etičku teoriju, 
opći moralni princip, hipotezu, duboko ukorijenjeno moralno vjerovanje ili pret-
postavku. Zamišljeni slučajevi često nam nude nove uvide, osvjetljenje problema 
ili novu perspektivu za njegovo promatranje. Jedno od otvorenih pitanja je koji 
je epistemički status i vrijednost tako potaknutih intuicija, s obzirom na njihovu 
varijabilnost i nestabilnost. Tekst kombinira umjerenu obranu moralnih intuicija s 
raspravom o odabranim aspektima uporabe slučajeva u podučavanju etike.
Ključne  riječi: moralna intuicija, refleksija, misaoni eksperiment, zamišljeni slu-
čajevi, podučavanje etike
